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additional epidemiological research," says
Dan VanderMeer, NIEHS director of the
Office of Program Planning and Evalu-
ation. "We decided to focus on those
health conditions that have been identified
in epidemiological studies."
Dubbed EMF RAPID, for Electric and
Magnetic Fields Research and Public
Information Dissemination, the program
was authorized by Congress in October
1992. Over a five-year period, Congress
authorized up to $65 million to support
research and public information. The law
also calls for matching private funds.
Using animal models, EMF RAPID
grant recipients are testing epidemiological
findings related to leukemia, breast cancer,
brain tumors, and other diseases,
VanderMeer reports. In addition, molecu-
lar and cellular studies are addressing possi-
ble biological mechanisms, including
immune-system suppression, direct or
indirect DNA changes, disruption ofcellu-
lar communications, and impacts on mela-
tonin, a hormone that blocks tumor for-
mation in vitro.
EMF RAPID funds were also used to
expand an existing NIEHS animal study
conducted as part of the National
Toxicology Program. At the IIT Research
Institute (IITRI), a 21,000-square-foot
laboratory makes it possible to expose
2,400 animals to magnetic fields under
highly controlled conditions, says Gary
Boorman, chiefofthe Pathology Branch in
the NIEHS Environmental Toxicology
Program. Principal investigator David L.
McCormick of IITRI exposes rats and
mice to magnetic fields to assess reproduc-
tive, immunological, and carcinogenic
effects, as well as melatonin levels.
In all studies, researchers are trying to
replicate robust effects, says Michael
Galvin, a general physiologist at NIEHS.
"An effect that appears only once and is
not robust enough to be replicated consis-
tently or demonstrates a so-called Cheshire
cat effect would be difficult to assess,"
Galvin notes.
Wertheimer worries that NIEHS
researchers may fail to identify a health
hazard because they are focusing on
whether EMFs initiate tumors. In fact, she
says, EMFs may promote cancer develop-
ment only when tumors are initiated by
some other agent. "The idea of direct
DNA damage is still foremost in their
minds," Wertheimer says of NIEHS offi-
cials. "I don't think that's what we're deal-
ing with here." However, according to
VanderMeer, NIEHS is also supporting
mechanistic studies ofpossible EMF effects
on cell signaling, cell membrane function,
tissue and organ systems, and free radicals.
"These mechanisms," says VanderMeer,
"are important irrespective of whether
EMFs may act as direct or indirect carcino-
gens.
The NIEHS decided to emphasize
tumor initiation because research groups in
Canada, Sweden, and Germanywere already
investigating co-promotion effects, Boorman
says. But, he adds, EMF RAPID funds will
support two co-promotion studies at IITRI.
Using genetically engineered rodents with a
known cancer susceptibility, McCormick's
team will assess whether EMFs speed tumor
development among animals exposed to car-
cinogens such as diethylnitrosamine. Plans
for additional promotion studies using a rat
breast cancer model are also being developed
at NIEHS.
Chemical Weapons: Safe
until 2004?
In a December 1994 report, the General
Accounting Office questioned an Army
assessment that the U.S. chemical weapons
stockpile can be safely stored until 2004.
This is Congress's latest deadline for the
Department of Defense to destroy stock-
piled unitary chemical weapons-those
that contain a single lethal agent.
Of concern are 478,000 M55 rockets
stored at sites in five states and on
Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.
According to GAO and technical consul-
tant Sandia National Laboratories in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, these stock-
piled M55 rockets are unstable as stored
and inadequately monitored by the Army,
the Department of Defense's lead service
in chemical matters.
Initially, Congress directed the De-
partment of Defense to destroy M55s and
the rest of the stockpile by 30 September
1994. When the Army fell behind in
Chemical Stockpile Munitions and Locations
Storage site Weapons Agents stored
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland Ton container H
Anniston Army Depot, Alabama Projectiles and cartridges H, GB, VX
M23 mine VX
Ton container H, GB
M55 rocket GB, VX
Blue GrassArmy Depot, Kentucky Projectiles and cartridges H, VX
Ton container H, GB
M55 rocket GB, VX
Johnston Atoll Projectiles and cartridges H, GB, VX
M23 mine VX
Ton container H, GB, VX
M55 rocket GB
Bomb GB
Newport Ammunition Plant, Indiana Ton container VX
Pine BluffArsenal, Arizona M23 mine VX
Ton container H
M55 rocket GB, VX
Pueblo Army Depot, Colorado Projectiles and cartridges H
Ton container H
Tooele Army Depot, Utah Projectiles and cartridges H, GB, VX
M23 mine VX
Bomb GB
Spray tank VX
Ton container H, GB, VX
M55 rocket GB, VX
Umatilla DepotActivity, Oregon Projectiles and cartridges GB, VX
M23 mine VX
Bomb GB
Spray tank VX
Ton container H, GB, VX
M55 rocket GB, VX
The chemical munitions stockpile is located at eight sites in the continental United
States and on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. Aberdeen Proving Ground and
NewportArmyAmmunition Plant store only bulk agent. SOURCE: Chemical Weapons,
Stability ofthe U.S. Stockpile, GAO, December 1994.
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implementing its $8.5 billion on-site incin-
eration program, Congress extended the
deadline to 2004 and asked the Army to
evaluate the stockpile's physical and chemi-
cal integrity. The Army's July 1993
report-based on inspection and laborato-
ry data and old stockpile assessment
reports-said the stockpile was safe for
now but uncertain beyond 2004. Congress
asked GAO to review the Army's estimate
and contingency plans if something goes
wrong.
Responding to the GAO report and
recommendations made in 1994 by the
National Research Council, the Army
Chemical Demilitarization and Remedi-
ation Activity, based at Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland, released a statement
February 16 that said work would begin in
fiscal year 1995 to determine the storage
life ofleaking and nonleaking M55 rockets.
Each M55 rocket consists ofa warhead
that carries 10 pounds ofnerve agent (GB)
and an explosive charge, and a solid-rocket
motor with a nitroglycerin-based propel-
lant and a stabilizer that keeps heat from
building up as the propellant decomposes.
Ifthe decomposing propellant gets too hot
or acidic, the M55 could autoignite.
All stockpiled weapons contain a mus-
tard/blister agent (H) or one of two nerve
agents (VX or GB). M55s carry GB, and,
the Army report adds, nerve agents, espe-
cially GB, become acidic over time and can
corrode metal warheads of rockets, mor-
tars, and projectiles.
"The propellant is unstable and so is
the chemical agent," says Donna Heivilin,
GAO's director of Defense Management
and NASA section and author ofthe 1994
report to Congress, "and the M55 design
makes it hard to physically separate the
Deadly Sarin
The death of 10 people and the injury of 5,000 more in the terrorist attack on the
Tokyo subway system March 19 serves as a tragic reminder ofthe lethal potential of
nerve agents.
The organophosphate sarin (isopropyl methyl phosphonofluoridate), also known as
GB, has been identified as a component ofthe gas used in the attack. Sarin was first
developed in Nazi Germany. At lethal doses, it can cause death within seconds when
inhaled. At more moderate doses, it can cause nausea, diarrhea, and interfere with
mental ability.
Sarin primarily affects the respiratory and nervous systems (see Munro et al., EHP
102:18-38). Subde changes in EEG patterns and increases in rapid eye movement dur-
ing sleep were observed in a group ofworkers one to sixyears after accidental exposure.
Brain damage has resulted at concentrations of sarin high enough to induce convul-
sions. Respiratory effects indude bronchoconstriction, wheezing, and increased airway
secretions.
Like other organophosphorus compounds, sarin works by inhibiting acetyl-
cholinesterase, an enzyme that breaks down the neurotransmitter acetylcholine, thus
overstimulating the nervous system. Once sarin enters the blood, it can penetrate the
blood-brain barrier. In the case ofsarin, death is caused by depression of the brain's
respiratory center.
Pupil constriction, or miosis, has been observed up to 60 days after exposure to
sarin. Eye pain and dim vision may also occur. Transient, prolonged changes in psy-
chological function, manifested as depression, nightmares, confusion, and deficits in
motor skills and intellectual ability have been observed in individuals exposed to
organophosphate insecticides, which are similar in structure to sarin.
However, unlike some organophosphate insecticides, long-term effects have not
been documented forsarin. "Sarin itselfshould not cause anylong-term healtheffects,"
said Nancy Munro ofthe Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
"[It is] highlyunlikely to cause carcinogenicity."
Indeed, studies have shown that sarin is neither carcinogenic, genotoxic, or terato-
genic. Delayed effects such as organophosphorus-induced delayed neuropathy
(OPIDN) may be more ofa concern. Although OPIDN has not been associated with
sarin exposure, it has been documented in people exposed to organophosphate insecti-
cides. OPIDN usually occurs within 5-30 days ofexposure, beginning with weakness,
tingling, and muscle twitching, and progressing to paralysis of the toes, hands, and
thighs. Recovery is slow and incomplete. The problem, according to Michael Ellis of
the University of Texas Medical Branch Poison Center in Galveston, is that
organophosphorus compounds accumulate in lipid tissues such as fat and nerves.
But, like Munro, Ellis emphasizes that long-term effects are not the concern with
sarin: "This stuff was made to kill people," he says. The ease of concocting deadly
agents such as sarin has stimulated questions aboutpublicsafetyworldwide.
propellant from the GB. If the propellant
blows up, the chemical agent would dis-
perse. This is what makes the M55 more
dangerous [than other stockpile weapons]."
Threats to stockpile storage include
earthquakes, plane crashes, tornadoes, acci-
dents during handling and maintenance,
autoignition of the propellant, and chemi-
cal leaks from the warhead. And the poten-
tial danger to human life is immense, even
ifone rocket ignited, because, according to
the Army's 1994 report, M55 Rocket
Storage Life Evaluation, "the resulting
explosion and fire in a storage igloo could
involve many of the 4,000 rockets that
typically are stored together."
"The congressional mandate is that the
Army dispose of these [unitary chemical
weapons] in the safest, most environmen-
tally sound fashion," says Craig Williams,
national spokesperson for the Chemical
Weapons Working Group, an internation-
al coalition of environmental and ecologi-
cal groups. "But the Army's focus is on the
comparative risk of continued storage ver-
sus incineration. We've been trying for
years to broaden the scope of that analysis
to include comparisons among continued
storage, reconfiguration, reconfiguration
with partial neutralization, and incinera-
tion."
Reconfiguration, Williams says,
"involves moving the M55s to a munitions
detonation-containment building, using
robots to disassemble the munitions, sepa-
rating chemical agents from other compo-
nents, and partially neutralizing the by-
products. Then we'd have hazardous waste,
which isn't great. But what we have now
are rockets and mortars ready to launch
and send nerve agents randomly into com-
munities. We'd have reduced the risk of
exposing chemical warfare agents to facility
workers and the community to zero."
At the Army Chemical Demilitarization
and Remediation Activity at Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Mark Evans, special assis-
tant to the program manager, says this is
easier than it sounds. To neutralize the
M55s, he says, "we'd have to build 90 per-
cent of the demilitarization [high tempera-
ture incinerator] facility we plan to build
anyway. We are updating cost estimates for
rocket separation, but there are no good
neutralization techniques for VX and GB,
and we'd produce a lot ofwaste. The Army
believes that ifthe risk assessments show the
rockets can be stored through 2013, our
incineration program is the safest method."
The neutralization proposal seems to
indicate that construction of the demilita-
rization facilities could be sped up, but
that's not true, according to Evans. A facil-
ity at Tooele Army Depot in Utah is built
and is in testing, Johnston Atoll's facility is
operational, and there are contracts to
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build and operate facilities at Anniston
Army Depot in Alabama (to be completed
in 1999), Umatilla Depot Activity in
Oregon, and Pine BluffArsenal in Arizona
(both to be completed in 2000). The Blue
Grass Army Depot facility in Kentucky
would be operational by 2002.
Over the next year, the Army will
examine two approaches for determining
the storage life of nonleaking M55s. The
Army's approach combines relatively new
data on propellant chemistry with a proba-
bilistic method for evaluating storage life.
According to this method, the chances of
autoignition are less than one in a million
before 2013. A second method derived by
Hercules Corporation, the propellant man-
ufacturer, estimates the chances of auto-
ignition are less than one in a million
before 2043.
There are no estimates on autoignition
for leaking M55s, which have been found
at all six munitions storage sites. Such
leaks, caused by corrosion that eats small
holes in the metal warheads, let chemicals
or vapors escape inside or outside the
weapon. External leaks can be quickly
detected by monitoring. Internal leaks
can't be detected without disassembling
the weapon, and a 1985 Army assessment
of M55 rockets estimated that 1-3% had
internal leaks.
But no one knows the extent of the
hazard these leaks pose; the GAO report
says the Army has never sampled the leak-
ing munitions because it considers them
too dangerous. The Army says there is
insufficient evidence to determine, as the
GAO report concluded, that leaking rock-
ets have a shorter storage life than nonleak-
ing rockets.
"It is not known ifleaking M55 rockets
could autoignite during handling if agent
were to come in contact with energetic
material found in the burster and fuse," the
Army statement says. "Previous assess-
ments ofthe stockpile stability have raised
the possibility, but there is insufficient data
to reach a conclusive determination. The
Army will determine what effects, if any,
the agent has on energetic material."
Responding to GAO's call for a contin-
gency plan for emergency disposal of the
M55, the Army says it will develop a plan
that outlines the steps it will take if the
rockets' deterioration accelerates.
Sandia further recommended that the
Army immediately expand its stockpile
monitoring to include propellant samples
from nonleaking and leaking munitions at
each storage location. But theArmy, whose
safe-storage-life projections of nonleaking
M55s are based on measuring master sam-
ples of rocket propellant stored at
Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey, says it
will continue using master samples for
periodic assessments after it verifies the
master samples still represent propellant
stored in the field.
Master samples are used, Evans says,
because "we have to think about putting
workers at riskwho extract propellant sam-
ple from fully loaded chemical munitions.
We use machines to cut the rounds apart
in a room with 28-inch-thick walls because
ofthe potential for problems."
The Army tests will include taking field
samples from Tooele, where some rockets
were partially dissassembled years ago, and
from Johnston Atoll, where some of the
rockets have leaked.
"If we do all those tests," says Evans,
"and the propellant is different from the
master samples, we'll need to initiate a
much more extensive field-sampling pro-
gram, and that will cost a lot ofmoney. If
we believe it's different and worse, you
may see us try to expedite activities at rock-
et sites." GAO agrees samples should be
taken from all sites, but says expanded
monitoring won't answer all questions
about stockpile stability.
"We have reason to believe that propel-
lant and agent affect each other, but we
don't know if it changes anything," Evans
adds. "Only one data point indicates that
it may. We need to move from 'it may' to
'it does' or 'it doesn't."'
Spying on the Environment
Since the end of the Cold War, the CIA,
which is facing budget cuts, has been
searching for new ways to use its spying
equipment, which is no longer being used
to its full capacity. In October 1992, the
CIA selected a team of70 civilian environ-
mental scientists to work with officials to
examine whether the CIA's spy equipment
could be used to provide information on
the environment. The idea was presented
by Vice President Al Gore, who had long
believed that the CIA's records contained
valuable information on climate, land use,
oceans, and atmospheric conditions.
The task force was given access to the
satellite system run by the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), whose name
was classified until last year, to determine if
the equipment could be applied to environ-
mental science. The CIA conducted a series
of 13 experiments to determine whether the
systems could be used to measure environ-
mental changes such as greenhouse gases,
ocean temperatures, polar ice thickness, and
forest and desert boundaries.
The satellites contain devices that are
able to take very detailed photographs at
close range through telescopes in all types
ofweather and light conditions. An exam-
ple of how this equipment could be used
for environmental purposes lies in the for-
mer Soviet Union. Dozens oflaunch clus-
ters and about 1600 missile silos are locat-
ed along a trans-Siberian railway. The CIA
satellites have been photographing this area
daily for decades. As a result, the CIA has
years ofdata on the snow melt in that area,
which is an indicator ofclimate change.
The CIA also has years ofocean data as
a result ofsubmarines in the Arctic collect-
ing sea ice measurements daily for decades.
Sea ice is also an important factor in cli-
mate change measurements.
The task force completed its initial
report last December, and it was circulated
throughout the intelligence community on
a classified basis. The scientists found that,
indeed, the CIA's archives and collection
devices could provide invaluable informa-
tion on climate change. The report is not a
policy document; it merely discusses the
possibilities.
Among the possibilities that the task
force discussed is the satellite tracking of
changes in vegetative and desert boundaries,
which may indicate global climate change.
Also, the report says that underwater listen-
ing systems could monitor fluctuations in
ocean temperature by measuring changes in
ocean soundspeed over long distances.
The report also addressed forests and
biodiversity. Currently, scientists have
access to civilian satellite photographs of
the world's forests taken by LANDSAT,
which produces infrared color images of
land areas and oceans. But the LANDSAT
photos are not nearly as precise as the
CIA's satellite photographs. LANDSAT
can only achieve resolution of 10 meters,
while the NRO can reach up to 10 inches.
While LANDSAT can only take broad pic-
tures of forests, the NRO satellites can
zoom in to count the number oftrees in an
area and determine what species they are.
The task force report says that scientists
could combine LANDSAT data with
NRO data to obtain detailed information
on forests.
The report also discusses the use of a
spy device that uses infrared technology to
analyze the chemical composition of
plumes ofmissiles as they streak across the
sky and other heat patterns, such as factory
emissions. The device could be used to
analyze the reflection ofsunlight offa for-
est canopy to determine the chemical com-
position of forests. This would provide
information on whether forests contain
certain chemicals that are necessary for
healthyvegetation.
The report says that the CIA also has
the ability to scan for forest fires. The
Defense Support Program early-warning
satellites, which are designed to detect mis-
siles emerging from silos, could be used to
detect forest fires.
The CIA could also use its Global
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